What we must always keep in mind when dealing with ideology or normative systems in general in a certain historical period is the contextual framework that surrounds it, the time in which it was created, the ideals it represented and how to explain the change of two normative systems - from the Old to New. In other words, it is necessary to see directly based on the discourse of a normative system: which ideals were represented and how these ideals were legitimized in relation to what preceded them, in relation to competing models in the present, and why these ideals were eventually destroyed, thereby contributing to the birth of a new normative structure.
The position of Themistius, as well as his entire generation, is all the more important because they lived in a time when the old world, the pagan world, was slowly dying. The name for this generation, coined by Edward J. Watts, is the Last Pagan Generation (Watts, 2015). The life of these pagans, from their youth until the end of their lifespan, was shaped and influenced by the waves of change that encompassed the empire. From their youth, trained to uphold the ideals of paideia, that world described by Tertullian where paganism was everywhere and omnipresent slowly disappeared. The arrival of Constantine changed this; ideals that were taken for granted and considered timeless began to fade. These young pagans did not notice this during their education; as Watts describes it, they lived in their own world, in their "academic bubbles," unaware that the empire was slowly changing around them. Constantine's policy was, if we look at it from Eusebius's perspective, almost revolutionary. While for the common people, Constantine was an emperor who, although favorable to Christianity mostly issued laws that concerned the unhindered operation of pagan religious practices, allowed the construction of temples (including one dedicated to him and his family at Hispelum) and almost he remained a pagan until the last moment.
Intellectuals, however, were not particularly aware of these changes. Praxagoras and Nicagoras did not pay attention, and Libanius did not even know exactly what were the changes that Constantine introduced in relation to the traditional religion. The youth of Libanius, Pretextatus, Ausonius and Themistius was devoted to school life, something that was considered obligatory for young members of the elite. Because education, as Ausonier claimed, "led toward good living, sound learning, and forceful speaking" (Watts, 2015). It was also a prerequisite for their participation in political life. The educational programs were strict and the punishments severe. What is interesting is how these four did not mention any changes that occurred while they were studying, considering that they were writing about their student days when they were already in their later years. While the image and imagination of Rome, as universal, was slowly redefined during the time of Constantine, Liberia and his peers spent their young days studying and reading classical literature (Watts, 2015). But that all changed in the 330s, when some people entered the political scene, and among them was Themistius. The death of Constantine was the decisive factor - until then, living under his regime since they knew themselves, they only knew the rules of Constantine's regime. However, that would change very soon. One of the biggest changes was precisely the arrival of these young people to important positions in the imperial system. How they responded to this new time and changing world: that's exactly the focus here, with Themistius as a singularly-concrete example.
Themistius was born in 317, in Gangra or Kimiata, Paphlagonia. We know little about his early life, especially in Paphlagonia. His family was neither particularly rich nor particularly poor. Although they were not rich, the significance of Themistius' family lies in the fact that its founder was recognized by Diocletian as a great philosopher. He only mentions his brothers and mother in Oratio 20. After the death of his father, Eugenius, it seems that he had a conflict with his brothers over the inheritance - not material, but over the right to tie himself to the family's philosophical heritage (Vanderspoel, 1995).
His education began in Paphlagonia. His father sent him to study rhetoric in Pontus, most likely in Neocaesarea (Vanderspoel, 1995). It is quite possible that he was taught by the father of Basil of Caesarea, Basil of Neocaesarea. We can reconstruct this thanks to the funeral sermon that Gregory of Nazianzus dedicated to his friend, Basil of Caesarea and his father. This allowed the young Themistius to become acquainted with Christianity. Themistius is thought to have come to Constantinople in 337 – 20 years before he visited Rome with Constantius, as he himself states. This means that at the age of 20 he came to Constantinople to study philosophy, which is unusual because philosophy studies generally began at the age of 15 or 16. However, most likely his life in Constantinople was not continuous, but cumulative (Vanderspoel, 1995). In other words, he most likely began his studies before the age of 20, because we also know that during the 340s he went all over the East, thanks to his teaching position in most of the important cities of the East. It should also not be overlooked that his father was already known in Constantinople from the 330s! Therefore, Vanderspoel claims that he began studying philosophy in 332/333. year, at the age of 15/16, under the tutelage of his father in Constantinople.
Eugenius had a huge influence on Themistius - he claims that it was because of his father that he decided to become a philosopher and that it was thanks to him that he first started reading Aristotle. In Oratio 20 he just points out that he is proud of having studied rhetoric in very distant regions, something for which he was criticized in Paphlagonia. There, in Oratio 20, he also emphasizes the value and necessity of rhetoric, which can only function and be sincere if it is associated with philosophy. This portrayal is important because of the inherent elitism of society and the prejudices about those who were not educated in famous schools. As for his education in the domain of classical literature, it can be reconstructed on the basis of Oratio 27, where we see his familiarity with Homer, Menander, Euripides, Sophocles, Sappho and Pindar. He had a thorough knowledge of Plato and Aristotle and, like many of his time, strove to create a synthesis of these two thinkers.
After completing his studies, Themistius married. We don't know exactly when, or the woman's name - we only know that her father was also a philosopher and that he too taught Themistius. His first son, Themistius, died in 356/7 and is thought to have been born shortly before the late 340s (Vanderspoel, 1995). That being said, it is likely that Themistius did not marry until 340. The source for this information is Oratio 34, which is also very important because it lays out clear Aristotelian principles of moderation, when it talks about whether philosophers are allowed to have children or not. Themistus' answer is positive; the philosopher must not exclude himself from society. In the 340s, Themistius began to teach throughout the East. Based on Oratio 24, we can determine that he taught in Nicomedia before 344, and that he met Libanius in Constantinople in 350. While he was in Nicomedia, he constantly emphasized the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy, which must be harmonious. But how, when these two elements are incompatible in the eyes of Plato?
The first thing that Themistius pointed out, when young people approach "rational philosophy", is that they are drawn away from it by sophists. They "sing pleasant familiar songs", whether "songs of the native land" (rhetoric), "Assyrian songs" (Christianity) or "songs from Lebanon" (Iamblichus, theurgy). On the other hand, the words of Themistius are the children of Mnemosyne and Zeus (the Muses), like the words of the sophists, but they differ for one key reason. The words of the sophists are pleasant, everyone wants to hear them, but they do it not because they have in mind the betterment of mankind but their own benefit. Philosophers, on the other hand, speak wisely, but have no intention of engaging in dialogue (as sophists do, but in the wrong way) - which makes philosophers similar to sophists, because like them, although the reasons are different, they do not work for the betterment of humanity. These views are repeated in Oratio 28, where, against accusations that he is a sophist, he emphasizes that his theory of the union of rhetoric and philosophy is correct and true, because Philosophy is high, serious and strict, which is why many (young) people are afraid of her and as a result they cannot accept the truths of Philosophy. That is why rhetoric is necessary, which is beautiful and ornate, and can lead young men to participate in public life and prepare them for the truths of Philosophy.
That's why harmony was necessary; it turned out that using only one side without the other led nowhere. Rhetoric is a necessary gaiety that serves as a medium to allow a person to enter philosophy and become aware that they must participate in the moral correction of their city first, and then through the knowledge of Philosophy, and the world. On the other hand, Philosophy had to leave its esoteric nature, which makes it inaccessible, and become the property of many people and not just a few. That is why it is wrong to consider that Themistius was a false philosopher or only an orator - he considered himself first a philosopher, and only then an orator - his view of philosophy, although Platonic and Aristotelian, was in this sense deeply innovative and original. It is not based on a great metaphysical revelation but precisely on the practical need for philosophy to become a property of humanity, and not an esoteric path to the Truth that would remain inaccessible to many.
After being in Nicomedia, Themistius went to Ankara. There, in 347, he delivered his first panegyric, dedicated to the Roman emperor, Constantius. Themistus' presence in Ankara can be explained by the fact that, as in Nicomedia, he had a teaching position there (Vanderspoel, 1995).
The reign of Constantius is, above all, a time of frequent interference of the emperor in church problems - especially those concerning the nature of Christ. This refers to the legacy of the Council of Nicaea (held in 325 AD) which clearly determined that Arianism = heresy. This bothered Constantius, himself an Arian, because of his firm belief that there must be a clear separation between God the Father and what emanates from him. On the other hand, it is necessary to emphasize that Constantius' policy towards the pagans was, in general, hostile (Heather, 2001). The question is how hostile.
Bearing this relationship in mind, it is necessary to incorporate another dimension within the relationship of Constantius towards paganism. This refers to the enormous problems of legislation: long distances, the inefficiency of the central bureaucratic structure and, finally, the local community.
This, in the end, also refers to the question concerning his religious policy; it is not entirely unreasonable to think, taking into account the still great strength of the local pagan cults, that any anti-pagan laws were in fact, if any, very mild, and that the central government now more than ever depended on the local communities for its enforcement. But the problems arise precisely because we do not know whether to believe Eusebius, who claims that Constantine was the first to abolish sacrifice. Because this cannot be confirmed anywhere else, and Libanius, contrary to Eusebius, claims that it was Constantius who initiated the anti-pagan measures all this complicates our picture of the attitude of the state towards the pagans in this period.
The Codex of Theodosius, as well as other later codes, do not help much in this matter. Since the anti-pagan policy became more intense from the time of Theodosius, there was no particular need to preserve what preceded that turn in imperial policy (Heather, 2001). Despite this, there is positive empirical evidence that it was Constantine who initiated the anti-pagan policy (Heather, 2001). If Eusebius is right, then we should pay attention to the fact that the prohibition was aimed primarily at sacrifices on altars dedicated to the gods. This is a specific prohibition; which indicates that other norms of the pagan form of pagan life were allowed. If all this is taken into account, including Constantine's creed, then it makes sense.
But what about Constantius? The Codex of Theodosius (16.10.4) preserved a law from the 350s, which states the following: ‘‘It is Our pleasure that the temples shall be immediately closed in all places and in all cities, and access to them forbidden, so as to deny to all abandoned men the opportunity to commit sin.’’ Instead of being interpreted as the closing of all the temples, this should be seen in the light of the last parts of the law: it is expressly mentioned that this law is enacted, first of all, that men should not fall into sin. In other words, the intention behind this law is similar to the intention behind Constantine's law, whereby it can be said that this is a repetition of Constantine's law. This does not mean, of course, that there was no closing of the temples. There were and Julian is the witness. However, no matter how explicit the order of the emperor himself was, the application of the new law, regardless, still depended on the local communities. Taking this into account, as well as some anecdotal accounts, such as Julian's visit to the temple of Athena in Ilium in 354, and the concern that a Christian priest (!) showed for pagan temples/statues there, indicate that the law, to some extent, was practically powerless.
While it is certain that Constantius' measures helped Christian officials in areas where they had the power to carry out the emperor's command, in areas where there was still a vital class of pagan landowners the emperor's measures ran into difficulties. What is important for us here is the dichotomy (which exists in the minds of church historians and defenders of pagan faith/philosophy) between Christians and pagans, and accordingly, the conflict between pagans vs. Christians. This was also contributed to by the writings of not only Julian, from the pagan side, but also Porphyry before him and other philosophers. However, does that moment occur everywhere? It does not appear, for example, in one very zealous pagan - Libanius. Based on his letters we can reconstruct that he had a Christian friend, Orion, whom he wanted to help with his "business". Julian's bishop of Pegasius at Ilium is another example. It is quite possible that the demolition of pagan temples, of which we have 6 recorded, was not a general norm but rather an exception.
However, this does not mean that there was no problem. The imperial power, for practical but increasingly religious reasons, could not count on its central bureaucratic structure to send news on time to the farthest part of the empire. On the other hand, no matter how many pro-Christian elements there were, it could not compensate for the huge number of people who were pagans and whose support was necessary to maintain the structure of the empire, not only in the center, but above all in the periphery. What was the share of Christianity in the empire? Today in historiography it is considered that, during the time of Constantius, there were: Consuls: 13 Christian, 6 pagan, 12 unknown, Praetorian prefects: 8 Christian, 3 pagan, 3 unknown, Urban prefects of Rome (352-361): 3 Christian, 2 pagan (Barnes, 1989; 1995). This picture, however, is not enough (Cameron, 2010; 2015). First of all, the problem is that the prosopography of certain persons cannot be representative of all officials who worked within the administration. The number of officials grew; statistically speaking, it is impossible to make any assessment based on such a small sample. Of course, the argument that because these were the highest positions somehow represents a certain bias towards hiring Christians, Heather and Cameron find it quite natural, and therefore inapplicable to the composition of lower or local bureaucracies.
There is a high probability that most of the people who were recruited were, in fact, pagans. Even if this were not so, the fact is that the Hellenic paideia was ubiquitous in the educational system of the empire, and that for Christians, as well as for pagans, to be educated in this way was a matter not only of necessity, but also of honor. Therefore, Constantius, although he was a zealous (Arian) Christian, his rule also rested on strong pagan roots (quantitatively and qualitatively). Because of this, it was necessary to establish an adequate balance between these two elements, to have some mediator who would be able to reconcile these two sides.
Themistius' strategy is very important here. On the one hand, he does not deny the Christianity of Constantius, nor that he cannot be reconciled with Hellenism, but instead of running away from it, he offers an answer for all of it: himself, because he is the one who can fix this ideological alienation that is happening . This was possible, among other things, because Christianity incorporated many elements of Platonism. The Logos appearing in the Gospel of St. John, or the systems of Clement of Alexandria and Origen, indicate the deep influence of the Platonist way of thinking (let's not forget Augustine). The most significant idea was Plato's division into the conceptual and physical world, as well as the dialectical (Platonist) relationship between unity and multiplicity. Platonic ideas especially had an impact on the creation of the image of Jesus who emanates from God, secondary to the Father which influenced Arianism. Themistus' strategy was to extract those particular features that were common to Christianity and Platonism and make selective use of them. Thus, he managed to offer a picture of the reconciliation of these two paradigms. It can also be said that his use of names for gods/God is an indicator of his strategy. He mentions Zeus and the gods, but also Theos in a context which exclusively refers to the Christian God. The adoption of this term by Themistius and the positive reception by his listeners, is a consequence of the growing pagan turn towards monotheism and henotheism in Neoplatonism. On the other hand, the Hellenistic concept of the king had a great influence on the institution of the emperor in Rome - the God-emperor relationship began to be interpreted, from the time of Constantine, as if it was God who bestows on the emperor, as his vicegerent, all power over the earth with the emperor being seen as the shadow of God. This is why Themistius calls Constantius, among other things, the Law Incarnate. Themistius' strategy even involved inserting quotations from the Bible. For example, he compared his concept of a tyrant to Judas. This underlines Themistius' habit of making a very careful selection from both bodies of ideas in his speeches.
Part of that strategy also meant that Themistius could not openly choose sides. Whether Moses preceded Plato (ideally) or vice versa - which was one of the leading debates of the time - did not count Themistius among its participants. Christianity and Neoplatonism functioned within a common episteme; which is why many pagan concepts, such as philanthropia or love for humanity, which Themistius attributed to the emperor and made him divine, were also used by Christians, such as Origen and Clement when they defined the love of man towards God, or in the council of Nicaea when it was defined that it was love for all humanity that moved God to sacrifice himself on the cross.
Themistius' strategy, then, was ultimately like this:
1. Present Constantius in a light that will be recognized by the pagans.
2. Show that the emperor's Christianity is not contradictory to paganism.
But in order to do all that, during a speech, Themistius had to make an impression. How? By breaking (almost) all the rules. This is the basilikos logos model, established by Menander the Rhetoric. His model implied a mixture of chronological-thematic structure. At the beginning, the speaker emphasized the subject of the speech while demeaning himself, adding that the speaker is insufficient to fully describe the majesty of the subject (the emperor). Then the speaker talks about the emperor's country, his hometown, his childhood, his achievements in war and peace. Quintilian, in the Latin instructions for organizing such a speech, recommended that the speech be divided according to the virtues: courage, justice, restraint and wisdom. In Menander, the first two virtues are related to war, and the second two to peace.
Themistius ignored all this. First, Themistius presented himself as a philosopher who cannot but tell the truth - just as Plato and Aristotle could not but tell the truth. Unlike the previous orators, Themistius makes a break and claims that his assessment is honest and objective, exclusively referring to the epistemology of Plato and Aristotle. Next, he openly insinuates that the emperor ought to learn from him, who also speaks in the name of the polity through the lens of the philosophical truth. It is the orator who teaches the emperor to truly be the emperor.
Saying that in front of the emperor and his "court" is a big deal. Even more important, he offers a solution: Constantius' rule, which is virtuous, on the one hand is thereby close to God, and on the other hand, although Christian, it upholds the Hellenic (ideal) model of paideia. Thus, already in Oratio 1 we have Themistius' abrupt break with the norms of the basilikos logos, in the form in which it was established by Menander. Themistius' originality (and courage) comes precisely from the fact that, taking Plato and Aristotle as a starting point, he openly defined to the emperor what the ideal ruler should be according to him - Themistius (which, of course, is true, because he can only speak the truth). Here, though, we should not forget that there were speakers who preceded Themistius in this manner. The most famous example is Dion Chrysostom (On Kingship). Moreover, Themistius borrowed a lot from Dion, such as the Platonic image of the ideal ruler.
Thematically speaking, Themistius' choice to approach the emperor like this made sense if he wanted (as he would) to be noticed and stick with him. Although it was obvious that he knew the norms of the basilikos logos, he certainly wanted to make an impression. Was it successful? Yes, in the long run, but we cannot accurately see the immediate consequences. Since we do not know when he became professor of philosophy in Constantinople, we cannot determine exactly whether this was due to Oratio 1 or not. But if we measure success by whether it was noticed - the answer is absolutely yes.
Lastly, we’ll deal with the subject of Constantius’ letter to Themistius. The letter addressed to Themistius to formalize his election in the senate, later as part of the collection that Themistius donated to the library of Constantinople in 357, is proof that Themistius was in a very privileged position. Constantius justifies his choice by highlighting Themistius' achievements, which primarily refers to his advocacy of an active, practical philosophy and solving problems within society (Heather, 2001). Themistius seems to have become very popular, too, as it is mentioned that Themistius succeeded in achieving what he advocated by teaching a ``community of young philosophers'' (Heather, 2001).
With popularity comes enemies. Themistius' activism was opposed to the Neoplatonic conception of the holy man. Themistius' vision was, in this respect, more Aristotelian than Neoplatonist; faithful to Plato, Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus and Proclus were ambitious systematizers, metaphysicians and teachers, but teachers who, for Themistius, dragged young people away from the social world to turn them on the path of "self-discovery" that alienated them from the community. Themistius' focus to achieve reconciliation with Christianity, and Neoplatonism's focus to defend paganism from Christianity through systematic metaphysics and ontology, could not be reconciled.
However Constantius, fully aware of Themistius' position, in some places in the letter praises Hellenic philosophy, and points it out as an example for all in the way Themistius practiced it! Philosophy, thus conceptualized, was the queen of all sciences as conceived by Plato and Aristotle, which is why it was also aligned with not only Constantius' but also Constantine's politics. Themistius had competition - dissenters. It allows us to enter the intellectual history of Constantinople during the 350s. Themistius' speeches, as well as the speeches of other respected scholars, were held in public spaces in front of an audience of students. One such place was the Theater of the Muses.
There are also anecdotes concerning Themistius' position as the wisest of his time - a philosopher came from Sicyon with his disciples to study with Themistius, after wondering who was the wisest man alive - and as in the case of Socrates, Delphi proclaimed Themistius for the wisest living philosopher. Supporters of Themistius, and those who were against - even Libanius could not withstand this tense atmosphere in Constantinople (he was banished from the city on charges of practicing magic). Criticism of the opposition, on the other hand, was that Themistius was not a philosopher but a sophist. He was not someone who sought wisdom, but used it for his own ambitions. For the opposition, the fact that he publicly taught students at the Theater of the Muses, thus gaining all the attention for himself was damning enough. Themistus' response to this criticism was to use Plato's definition of a sophist to prove that he was not one, and then attack the person who accused him of it with ad hominems. As for the charge that he was a sophist, and that his speeches were an innovation for the sake of attracting attention (in relation to the established models of basilikos logos), Themistius replied that although his speeches were newer, he was imitating Socrates in this. He was not a mercenary or a sophist but a true philosopher who did not ask for money from students, nor did he use the public goods under his jurisdiction for political purposes.